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Optimism and overconfidence are well documented cognitive biases in the 
entrepreneurship literature (see Shepherd et al., 2015). Although these attitudes 
are  typically thought to be almost overlapped, empirical studies make evidence of 
their different construct (see Trevelyan, 2008, 2011). In the paper at hand we go a 
step further in dwelling the descriptive and normative motivations inducing 
misconfidence biases to arise. First, we introduce the definition of optimism as 
under-estimation of the task difficulty. Second, we define overconfidence as the 
tendency to overestimate the probability to achieve an uncertain task. To calculate 
this  probability we set up a prescriptive benchmarking-based model.Third, we 
spotlight situations in enterprise risk management (ERM) where misconfidence 
biases in judgment emerge. In the path of Bordley et al. (2014) results, 
overconfidence arises in presence of: (1) optimism coupled with poor 
entrepreneurial projects, and (2) pessimism coupled with good entrepreneurial 
projects. The influence of the escalation and de-escalation of commitment effect 
biases is also discussed. Our study builds a normative foundation for 
overconfidence and casts light on which circumstances that occurs. Our results 
have  also practical implications. In fact, it is important for entrepreneurs be aware 
of situations where self-confidence is normatively biased and so, if necessary, 
mindfully rethink the assumptions and strategies. 
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Research in entrepreneurship recognizes that entrepreneurs are individuals generally 
prone to fail in optimism and overconfidence biases (see Shepherd et al., 2015 for an 
ample review on entrepreneurial heuristics and biases, and specifically Everett and 
Fairchild 2014; Engelen et al., 2014; Galasso and Simcoe, 2011; Hmieleski and Baron 
2009). The optimism bias refers to entrepreneurs‟ tendency  to underestimate the difficulty 
of the goal  to meet; whereas overconfidence bias refers to  the tendency to overestimate 
the probability of success of the entrepreneurial project at hand. These cognitive biases 
are typically thought to be positively interdependent and even overlapped. However 
supported by empirical studies based on online surveys Trevelyan (2008) claims that 
optimism and overconfidence are distinct constructs with no relevant positive association. 
Extending this line of inquiry, we delve deeper their differences and explore why 
entrepreneur rationally engage biased judgements. 
 
First, we give a formal definition of optimism according to the perceived difficulty to 
achieve the goal. The more the goal is easy-perceived, the higher the agent optimism 
level; and vice versa for hard-perceived goals. In the path of Bordley et al. (2014) we 
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illustrate the link between the easy/hard goal perception and the agent gain-seeking/loss-
aversion attitude.  
 
Second, we suggest a probabilistic definition of self-confidence miscalibration based on 
the gap in evaluation between the entrepreneur and a well-calibrate external expert. To 
calculate the subjective probability to achieve the goals we use a benchmarking model 
under risk (see Castagnoli and Li Calzi, 1996; Beccacece and Cillo 2006). 
 
Third, we present the main contribution of the paper. We identify situations in enterprise 
risk management (ERM) where misconfidence biases in judgments emerge. Following 
Bordley et al. (2014), we prove that overconfidence arise in connection with: (1) agent‟s 
optimism coupled with expected poor entrepreneurial performances, and (2) agent‟s 
pessimism coupled with expected good entrepreneurial performances.  
 
In conclusion, we build a theoretical framework that: (1) sets a different definition for 
optimism and overconfidence biases; (2) provides foundation for overconfidence  conform 
with the prescriptive Expected Utility theory (see von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) 
and the descriptive Prospect Theory (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979); (3) spotlights  
circumstances where self-confidence judgement is normatively biased. Our results have 
also practical implications. In fact, to make mindful evaluations entrepreneurs must be 
conscious when they are predisposed to fall in misconfidence traps. 
  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the 
definitions of optimism and overconfidence. In Section 3 we set up a target-based 
theoretical model to calculate the probability to achieve the goal. Sufficient conditions for 
misconfidence in judgement are set out in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the article. 
 
2.  Optimism and overconfidence biases in the language of probability  
 
 
Shepherd et al. (2015) provide an extensive review of the several heuristics and biases 
documented in the entrepreneurial decision-making process. Among others, 
overconfidence and optimism are recognized key drivers in contributing  on either the firm 
development and success or the firm failure. Optimists are defined as people who tend “to 
hold positive expectancies for their future” (see Scheier et al., 1994) and  look at the  
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goals through “rose-tinted glasses” (see the seminal studies of Lichtenstein et al. 1977, 
1982). Vice versa, overconfident entrepreneurs are defined as individuals who 
overestimate the probability of successfully meeting their  commitments (see Conine, 
2014). Despite a common believe, Trevelyan (2008) has made evidence that  no 
association exists between optimism and overconfidence. To evaluate uncertain projects 
the entrepreneur has to fix  a goal to achieve. However, in real world the commitments are 
often vague and uncertain.  In other words, goals are random variables. It follows that the 
agent is asked to deliver her personal views in the language of probability. 
To explain this point, let start with an example. A manager  has to evaluate a project with 
an uncertain cash flow. The standard guide-lines in the corporate finance literature 
suggest to check the financial capital sustainability on the basis of measurable Key 
Performance Indicators (see Brealy et al., 2006) as:  
1. Return on Equity (ROE);  
2. Return on Debt (ROD);  
3. Return on Investment (ROI).  
Under the assumption of perfect capital market, the Modigliani-Miller formula (see 
Modigliani and Miller, 1958) relates the profitability indicator ROE of a project with the 
financial leverage ratios as follows: 
   1ROE ROI SPREAD DER tax       
Where 
SPREAD ROI ROD  , 
DER = Debt Equity Ratio or financial leverage 
tax = average tax 
 
Specifically, Modigliani-Miller’s formula pinpoints the key role played by the difference 
SPREAD ROI ROD  . That quantity not only signs the profitability direction of ROE, but 
also emphasizes its value due to its multiplicative effect. A basic condition for financial 
sustainability of the project is given by:   
ROI ROD . 
If the cash flows of the project are uncertain, ROI and ROD are uncertain as well. 
Therefore, above condition needs  to be translated in the language of probability. So, 
instead to check whether above inequality holds, we are asked to calculate:  
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the probability that the (uncertain) ROI of the project be higher than the  (uncertain) ROD,  
 
and only if that value is sufficiently high the project will be taken under consideration. In 
Section 3 we show an operational way to make the probability calculation. But before  a 
definition of optimism is needed.   
 
2.1  Optimism: look at commitments through “rose-tinted” glasses 
 
Intuitively speaking an agent is optimist whether she tends to have a “pinked view” on the 
commitments. The problem of how an agent calibrates the subjective perception of the 
task difficulty has been investigated in the last twenty years in the experimental 
psychology literature see Lichtenstein et al. (1982), Yates (1990) among others. The 
subjective judgments depend on: (1)  the individual cardinal utility capturing the individual 
risk preferences and (2) the personal “reference point” (see Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979). Then two practical questions arise:  
 
Q1.: How to elicit the individual cardinal utility/value function? 
Q2.: How to set the appropriate “reference point”? 
 
Let start to tackle Q1. Let u a bounded, increasing (but not constant) and continuous 
cardinal utility function. As seminally discussed by Borch (1968) in the context of ruin 
probabilities, without loss of generality, u can be normalized so that  inf 0u x  and 
 sup 1u x  . Then u satisfies all the properties characterizing a cumulative distribution 
function (c.d.f.).  As Berhold (1973, p. 825) states “there are advantages to having the 
utility function represented by a distribution”, because we can grasp intuitive 
interpretations. In fact, if F denote  the c.d.f. of the uncertain target T, then  
      u x P x T F x    (1) 
See Berhold (1973, p. 825). Equation (1)  states a fundamental equivalence:  the c.d.f. F 
of the target T just coincides with the normalized utility function u. To put it differently, 
Equation (1) tells us that we can think of the agent cardinal utility  u x  as the probability 
that the uncertain target T is not greater than x. We conclude that all information about the 
Proceedings of 4th European Business Research Conference 




agent optimism can be just extrapolated from the perceived shape of the c.d.f. of the 
target T.   
We are now ready to face Q2. In the last twenty years, this question is became a central 
one in the experimental and theoretical economics, see Hoffmann et al. (2013).  
We have to distinguish between the objective and subjective reference point:  
 
 The objective reference point: the median 
In experimental research the most common “reference point” is the median of the 
distribution of possible outcomes; see Heath et al. (1999). Let remind the definition. Given 
a random target T, the value m such that   
   0.5P T m    and    0.5P T m    
is called a median of T. The median thus defined always exists, and is unique. Alternative 
definitions are possible, but they yield the same value when the distribution of T is 
continuous and unimodal. Hereafter we consider only targets with unimodal distributions. 
 
 The subjective reference point: the mode 
Let assume the target T a unimodal
3
 random variable with mode M. As a consequence, 
the correspondent  c.d.f.  F x  defined on the support  ,a b , turns out to be an S-shaped 
c.d.f., that is convex for  ,x a M   and concave for  ,x M b . The concavity switching 
point is in correspondence of the mode M. To find out the agent perceived reference point 
we use formula (1). According to Prospect Theory (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), 
the subjective reference point corresponds to  the subjectively perceived “knock-out” value 
that divides the domain of the perceived losses from that of the perceived gains. By (1)  
the  agent utility u coincides with the c.d.f. F, so u is  S-shaped with the concavity 
switching point in correspondence of M, as well. In conclusion, the agent reference point is 
just the mode M. 
As discussed in Bordley et al. (2014)  the definition of hard-perceived and easy-perceived 
task is given on basis of the gap between the target most likely value delivered by the 
agent, i.e. the mode M; and that delivered by an external expert, i.e. the median m. 
Intuitively, if the value M expressed by the agent is lower than that m,  then the agent feels 
the target easier than the external expert does; in such a case the agent is called an 
                                            
3
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optimistic individual. Vice versa if M is higher than m, the agent is called a pessimistic 
individual. If M and m coincide then the agent is called a well-balanced in judgement 
individual (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figura 1 Hard-perceived target, symmetric-perceived target and easy-perceived target. 
 
    
A simple condition for testing the presence of optimism or pessimism is offered by the so-
called van Zwet mean-median-mode inequalities; see van Zwet (1979). Let a unimodal 
continuous target T with mean  , median m and mode M.  Then: 
a) if the agent is pessimist, then m M   ; 
b) if the agent is optimist, then M m   ; 
c) if the agent is well-balanced in judgement, then T is symmetric and m M   . 
The alphabetical/counter-alphabetical order among mean, median and mode offers a 
user-friendly test for optimism/pessimism measuring
4
 (see Figure 1).  
 
The intuition behind follows. Optimistic agents perceive the goal as an easy task, and set 
the subjective reference point, i.e. the mode M, smaller than the objective one, i.e. the 
median m; and vice versa pessimistic agents perceive the goal as a hard task and set the 
subjective reference point, i.e. the mode M, higher than the objective one, i.e. the median 
m. If the agents have symmetric-perceived opinions, the subjective and objective 
reference point coincides. 
 
Due to the equivalence (1) between the target c.d.f. and the agent utility function, Bordley 
et al. (2014, Theorem 2.) state the equivalence between the easy/hard target perception 
and loss aversion/gain seeking attitude. On the loss domain the utility function is convex 
                                            
4
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that shows the agent gain seeking attitude, whereas on the gain domain the utility function 
is concave that exhibits the agent risk aversion (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figura 2. A S-shaped utility/value function 
 
Above is also related with the regulatory focus theory (see Higgins, 1998, Higgins et al., 
2001). If individuals have a promotion focus, they exhibit risk-seeking attitude and are 
endowed with a convex utility function. Alternatively, if they have a prevention focus, they 
display risk-aversion and are endowed with a concave utility function. 
 
3.  Overconfidence: miscalibration of  the success probability 
 
Since the seminal studies of Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977) and Kahneman and 
Tversky (1977, page 5) confidence miscalibration has been documented and studied in 
social sciences. Moore and Healy (2008) distinguish three different facets of confidence 
miscalibration: (a) the misconfidence, i.e. a fallacious confidence in own performance; (b) 
the overplacement or „better-than-average‟ effect, i.e. the misconfidence in own 
performance relative to others; and (3) the overprecision, i.e.  the tendency to have 
excessive trust in forecasting  future uncertainty. In the following, we focus on (1)  the self-
misconfidence. We say that an agent gives a “misaligned judgement” when her personal 
evaluation of the probability of success is misaligned respect to that expressed by the 
external expert. A crucial point turns out:  
 
How to measure the probability of meeting the target? 
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To achieve this objective, we draw upon the benchmarking procedure. 
The benchmarking procedure originally proposed by Castagnoli and LiCalzi (1996) 
indicates an operational way to calculate the probability that an (uncertain) project X 
overcomes the (uncertain) target T. This prescriptive target-based model satisfies von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947)‟s and Savage (1954)‟s axiomatization through a 
probabilistic and intuitive interpretation of the expected utility of a lottery X. Bordley and 
LiCalzi (2000) prove that the expected utility of a lottery X can be read as the probability 
that X outperforms a stochastically independent target T with c.d.f. u, i.e. 
      EP X T u X                                     (2) 
where  .E  is the expectation operator. This interpretation shows the key advantage in 
using the benchmark-procedure: the subjective beliefs about the probability of 
successfully meeting the target coincides with the expected utility of X. In conclusion all 
we need to calculate (2): (a) the perceived c.d.f. of the uncertain target index T 
(corresponding to ROD in the example in Sec. 2); and (b) the c.d.f. of the uncertain 
financial index X of the project (corresponding to ROI in the example in Sec. 2). 
 
4. When does misconfidence occur? 
 
Using Bordley et al. (2014, Theorem 3) sufficient conditions for misconfidence biases can 
be stated. For explanatory purposes, we word them in the frame of the example described 
in Sec. 2. 
Let ROD  an uncertain target with median m.  Suppose that an external expert declares 
equal to m the most likely value for ROD.  Let ROI is the financial index chosen to 
measure the financial attractiveness of the uncertain project at hand. Let ROI  is 
independent of ROD. Then if the agent perceives that: 
 
a) the most likely value for ROD is smaller than m (i.e. she faces an easy-perceived 
target) and the support of ROI belongs to  ,m , i.e. the expectancies on the 
financial project outcomes are very bad, or 
b)  the most likely value for ROD is greater than m (i.e. she faces a hard-perceived 
target) and the support of ROI belongs to  ,m  , i.e. the expectancies on the 
financial project outcomes are very good,  
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then the agent  exhibits overconfidence on the probability that ROI ROD . And vice 
versa, if the agent perceives that: 
 
c) ROD  is greater than m (i.e. she faces a hard-perceived target) and the support of 
ROI belongs to  ,m , i.e. the expectancies on the financial project outcomes are 
very bad, or 
d) ROD is smaller than m (i.e. she faces an easy-perceived target) and the support of 
ROI belongs to  ,m  , i.e. the expectancies on the financial project outcomes are 
very good,  
 
then the agent  exhibits underconfidence on the probability that ROI ROD .  
 
Immediate evidences turn out. The optimism attitude and the overconfidence bias are 
distinct constructs. That is consistent with Trevelyan (2008, 2011) empirical studies, where 
the association sign between these two biases is not clear. The very gears in moving 
towards over/under confidence are: (1) the expected performances of the uncertain 
project measured by ROI as in the example in Sec. 2; (2) the attitude of believing in having 
to face an easy/hard task. In experimental psychology, conditions a) to d) are related to 
cognitive biases as follows: 
 
a) Overconfidence in handling with very-poor projects is commonly associated with the 
“escalation of commitment effect” (see the seminal studies of Staw, 1976). That is also 
referred to the “sunk cost fallacy” that is the misleading behavior that guide managers to 
invest resources into failing businesses. This bias is also set in relation with the "hot-hand 
fallacy" (also known as the "hot hand phenomenon" or "hot hand"). That is the false  belief 
that an entrepreneur who has once experienced success has a greater chance of further 
success in the future, although the project at hand displays realistic poor expectancies. 
These circumstances correspond to case a). 
 
b) Dealing with hard-perceived tasks coupled with very good expectancies on the 
outcomes (see case b)) may drive ambitious managers to be overconfident. That is 
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commonly explained as an effect of the  “desirability bias” that influences the evaluation of 
desired event occurrence (see e.g. Giardini et al., 2008). 
 
c) When pessimism in evaluating the target difficulty is associated to poor 
expectancies on the project outcomes,  a loss averse entrepreneur tends to be 
underconfident in successfully meeting the target (see case c)). That tendency may be 
explained by the influence of “pessimism bias” that induces the “status quo effect”. That is 
related also with the loss and gain asymmetry in judgment according to the statement that 
“losses loom much than gains” see Kahneman and Tversky (1979, page 279). Another 
possible motivation can be blamed to the “de-escalation effect” that  typically occurs when 
the task is perceived extremely difficult (see Lee et al., 2014). 
 
d) Underconfidence detected in case d) can be explained by the “de-escalation 
effect”, as documented by Lee et al. (2014). An easy-perceived task may reduce the  “goal 
attainment”  and consequently cause a disaffection in achieving the goal. 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper is a part of the growing literature on the impact of behavioral biases on 
entrepreneurial decision-making process (see Shepherd et al., 2015). Specifically, we 
focus on the optimism and overconfidence biases. We contribute to the literature in 
various ways.  
First, we introduce a formal definition for optimism, as the tendency to underestimate the 
difficulty of the task to achieve, then we define overconfidence, as the tendency to 
overestimate the probability of meeting the commitments. Second, we identify a practical 
method to calculate the subjective probability to achieve a given task. Third, we identify 
circumstances where inconsistencies in self-confidence arise.  
Our results have  also practical implications. In fact, being conscious of being normatively 
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